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  Flusser Archive, Kunsthochschule für Medien, Cologne, March 2006 (photograph | Tim O’Riley) 
 
“The soul that dreams before a light cloud receives at once the image of effusive matter and the dynamic image of 
ascent. In such a reverie about losing a cloud in the blue sky, the dreamer participates with all his being in a total 





To what extent do images remain resistant to their assimilation by the linguistic and technical 
systems that society has developed? The increasing plethora of images—maybe it is as accurate to 
say photographs, given the ubiquity of smartphones and the cameras they carry—produced and 
shared daily undoubtedly pose questions about what constitutes subjectivity. It could also be 
maintained that the metadata associated with these images—detailing the location, time, and date 
at which the photograph was produced, for example—represent a (further) attempt to incorpo-
rate them into the aforementioned system, which as Vilém Flusser argued draws on a mode of 
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thinking that is inherently linear. (Flusser 2002a: 110–6; Flusser 2005a; Flusser 2000) But the im-
age, even though it may be constituted digitally, that is, made up of code with its visual form de-
termined by that code, is experienced, perceived, or ‘read’ in a fundamentally different manner to 
the linear thinking encouraged through characters—alphanumeric symbols—arranged sequential-
ly to form texts (words or equations or computer code, for example). With the image, laterality is 
as significant as linearity. Incompleteness is unavoidable. The form of the image does not pre-





Early experiments in the type of spatial representation that came to be known as ‘perspective’—
for example, Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s The Annunciation (1344) or Filippo Brunelleschi’s lost paint-
ing / mirror assemblage of the Florentine Baptistery from the early 15th century—introduced the 
notion that the world could be represented through a potentially unified system based on a ra-
tional understanding of the distribution and order of things. A representation could feasibly jostle 
with the actual world in terms of believability, the apparent disposition of things presenting to 
the eye and brain in a manner ideally identical to such a distribution given by the actual world. If 
an illusion of this sort were regarded from exactly the right position, one could be fooled into 
thinking that what was being seen was ‘real’. 
Much has been written about the origins and development of perspective and its relation to 
subsequent representational systems such as perspective’s (much later) relative, the camera. (For 
example, Damisch 1994; Edgerton 1975; Gombrich 1993; Kemp 1990; Kubovy 1986; Pirenne 
1970) An optical reality, in which the photograph could be regarded as analogous to—or at least 
a cousin of—that produced by a perspectival system, is perhaps one thing. A conceptually insti-
gated, theoretically posed reality, such as that produced by a three-dimensional computer model-
ling, gaming or virtual reality system, is another. The connectivity enabled through today’s com-
puters means such a ‘space’ is inhabitable across or superimposed upon actual space. Flusser 
wrote about the relative density of thought such digital apparitions signify: the more dense the 
distribution of points, the more focused and tangible the results. “Something is more real the 
denser the distribution is, and more potential the more scattered it is. What we call ‘real’, and also 
perceive and experience as such, are those areas, those curvatures and convexities, in which the 
particles are distributed more densely and in which potentialities realise themselves.” (Flusser 
1996: 245) It is perhaps less an issue of whether or nor not such apparitions are considered ‘re-
al’—given a source of electrical power as a prerequisite, the data streams within the electronic 
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realm are as tangible and affective as the table upon which I write—yet, more that reality is as 
ghostly as these apparitions.  
 
“/Cloud/ has no particular meaning in itself; its only meaning is that which stems from the relations of consecu-
tiveness, opposition, and substitution that link it to other elements in the system.” (Damisch 2002: 45) 
 
Hubert Damisch’s notion of /cloud/ could perhaps be regarded as that which is unassimilable 
into the perspective schema. (Damisch 2002: 14) In his system, the word cloud enclosed between 
forward slashes // signals its identification as a signifier; italics signal its use in a denoting capaci-
ty; and cloud is enclosed in quotation marks when it refers to that which is signified. The /cloud/ 
in renaissance paintings refers to the thing that interrupts a rational system and order, on both 
symbolic and actual levels. (Among others, Damisch references Correggio’s The Vision of St John 
on Patmos, 1520-24, or Francisco de Zurbarán’s Vision of the Blessed Alonso Rodriguez, 1633.) It her-
alds that which cannot logically be constructed within the grid of perspective and by definition 
subverts it, suggesting an alternative realm that remains resistant to ordering.  
Using a semiotic approach to writing about painting—that is, religious painting for the 
book’s majority—Damisch discusses adjacent “zones” (2002: 152) or spheres of experience. One 
could be said to exist within the everyday world, steeped in the tangible spaces and things of the 
environment around us. This is the world associated perhaps with the consecutive reasoning to 
which Keats took exception.1 (Keats 2014a: 69) Enmeshed in the relationship of signifier and 
signified, /cloud/ is representative of the transitional space between the consecutive world and, 
as Damisch describes it, another zone: the realm of the sacred, “a dimension of transcendence” 
(Damisch 2002: 145). “Not only does the cloud liberate those whom it supports from the laws of 
gravity, but at the same time it shows how profane space may open onto another space which im-
bues the former with its truth.” Cloud represents “an irruption of otherness or of the sacred.” (2002: 
43, italics in original) It signifies a rent in the screen separating divine reality from the everyday. It 
is “an immediate manifestation of the sacred… that descends to share in the exile of human be-
ings”. (2002: 44) Rather than opening onto infinite space, linear perspective—whose horizon line 
and vanishing point(s) imply a realm beyond but serve to demarcate the visible limits of the ration-
al—defines an “assured closure” (2002: 172). Space beyond remains unknown. /Cloud/ serves to 
disrupt this system and signifies a transition between realms. Moreover, if it is possible to put the 
                                                         
1 Keats actually uses the word ‘consequitive’ when discussing the quest for truth: “I am the more zealous in this 
affair, because I have never yet been able to perceive how any thing can be known for truth by consequitive reason-
ing—and yet it must be—Can it be that even the greatest Philosopher ever arrived at his goal without putting aside 
numerous objections—However it may be, O for a Life of Sensations rather than of Thoughts!” (Keats 2014a: 69) 
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religious convictions behind such paintings to one side, if it is possible to see /cloud/ in secular 
terms, can it be equated with the transition between a lived world and the space of imagination?  
Today’s computer modelling systems can easily construct such fluid phenomena and represent 
them within the grid or matrix hinted at in paintings such as that by Lorenzetti. The sophistica-
tion and level of detail afforded by this technology is potentially without limit. Yet despite the 
calculability of such phenomena and their re-creation within the confines of the computer—and 
the increasing ‘density’ of this information, to use Flusser’s terminology—a sense still persists of 
the unexpected, the unanticipated, or the unforeseen. A question poses itself. If /cloud/ can be 
assimilated within the codes of mathematical, programmable logic and according to the demands 
of a representational grid, are there still phenomena that resist modelling? Or is the level of un-
derstanding of material reality such that everything is now fair game for assimilation? Modern 
physics has mapped the world / universe / reality to such a degree of exactitude, of granular de-
tail, that it remains far from possible that there are ‘things’ (in the broadest sense of the term) 
that escape rationalisation into a system. The scientific understanding of a phenomenon lies be-
hind its eventual computability (Deutsch 1998) and it is likely that someone somewhere and at 
some point will formulate this or that understanding. So perhaps it is better to mull over the idea 
of /cloud/ more as a persistent trope than a physically tangible object; it is useful as a significa-
tion of the unassimilable. 
 
        
  Tim O’Riley, (still from) Figure of Eight, 2005–7 (digital animation, PAL, 20 second loop) 




What follows is a brief exploration of Flusser’s ideas concerning the image, the text, and the 
technical ‘apparatus’, which are useful when thinking about such tensions between the systematic 
and the thing that works against the system. When imagining, we step back from the world into 
ourselves, into what Flusser called a "nonplace". "When making a picture, we not only observe 
but imagine. We step back from the world into ourselves, into somewhere not so much a place as 
a nonplace. Our imagination is our capacity to withdraw from the world into that nonplace." 
(Flusser 1988: 14) We distance ourselves from the world we are in so as to comprehend better 
our ‘context’. Pictures are a means of fixing the products of this withdrawal. They make them 
communicable and accessible to others. But pictures also serve to obscure the objects they repre-
sent (or at least they jostle with the world for our attention). A picture is (on the whole) formed 
on a surface over which the eye wanders as it pleases. It does not offer a conclusion but presents 
a wholeness, a synchronic totality that is animated by the observer. In this sense images are magi-
cal. They present states of things; they allow for contradictory interpretations; they present them-
selves before the thing they represent. If we step back from the world into ourselves in order to 
see our context, to see the wood in spite of the trees, in doing so we lose the specific nature of 
the thing. It becomes hidden by the image. “Images are meant for people to orient themselves in 
the world. But when they become very strong, people use their experience in the world to orient 
themselves in the image... An inversion of the relationship between the world of experience and 
the world of imagination is called idolatry.” (Flusser 2005c)  
Throughout his work, Flusser argues that this predisposition to imagine, to think in images, 
and to relate to the world through images was characteristic of a symbolic, magical consciousness 
radically altered through the invention of writing. In contrast to the image’s open surface, the text 
necessitates the eye’s direction along a path in order to receive a specific message. “Linear codes 
demand a synchronization of their diachronicity. They demand progressive reception.” (Flusser 
2002b: 39) This results in a new experience of time, a linear time as opposed to a circular, cyclical 
time. In his thinking, with the advent of writing, history begins and with it, the articulation and 
recording of (past) events. Like the image, the text also distances our relationship to the world 
but at a further level. Writing was developed to demystify the image, to determine it. In so doing, 
it too obscures the image embedded within it. The layers of mediation between world and subject 
proliferate and a progressive reliance on the text as a means of negotiating the world effects a 
shift away from idolatry to textolatry. Flusser cites an over reliance on scientific, religious or po-
litical doctrines as examples of this.  
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The victory of texts over images, of science over magic is not conclusive, however. The line-
arity of written language was too uncritical when applied to the rationalising functions of an 
emerging scientific approach. Therefore the bits or ‘pixels’ that constituted writing (that were 
torn from the image) had to be processed formally, they had to be calculated. Flusser saw calcula-
tion as the highest expression of historical consciousness. “Only an imagination that has been 
thoroughly calculated can be considered explained.” (Flusser 2005a) Until Descartes, Newton 
and Leibniz, the numeric code remained tangled in the alphabetic code. Calculus was developed 
and refined in order to enlighten, to provide a surer means with which to grasp the world, to 
explain and further ‘dis-enchant’ the image. Mathematical notation provided a means of deter-
mining the nature of the world precisely and without ambiguity, but in time such ‘texts’ become 
abstract to a degree that they too further distance the world.  
Flusser’s book on photography introduces the principle of the ‘technical image’. This is a key 
element of his philosophy, which he would later develop in relation to a broader conception of 
the notion of ‘media’. (Flusser 2000) Scientific texts construct human perceptions such that a 
direct connection with the world becomes ever more tenuous. As a result, he determines that 
‘technical images’, the first instance of which was the photograph, were developed in order to 
illuminate the abstractions embodied by such texts. Although one can without hesitation assert 
the importance of the pioneering photographers’ visual ambitions, photography was in part a 
development of scientific knowledge (optics and chemistry). Earlier technical forms such as per-
spective are perhaps trickier to assimilate into this model. In this instance, the image is less the 
product of a system; a rational matrix of spatial ordering forms is only an aspect of the artist’s 
representational lexicon—and significant to a greater or lesser degree depending on the particular 
artist in question. The development of perspective involved artists’ visual experiments, observa-
tions and invention as much as it did a purely scientific approach to spatial configuration. Lo-
renzetti’s gridded floor perhaps suggests a rationalising desire yet reflecting on it also raises the 
necessary interplay of practice and theory; the experience of making a painting is, after all, always 
in dialogue with notions or theories of how it can be put together, the motivations behind it, or 
its (critical) relationship to its context. Perhaps it was only later, as the techniques and theories of 
perspective became formalised did perspective’s essence as a technical form become apparent. 
Moving forward to the second half of the 19th century and onwards to the present day, technical 
images (in the sense of an image-producing apparatus) begin to proliferate and as operators, pro-
ducers and consumers of photography, film, television and video, and now digital images of all 
sorts, humans become functionaries of these ‘apparatuses’. 
This critique of photography is based on Flusser’s picture of the shift from magical / sym-
bolic thought through historical / linear thought, a thinking and consciousness effected through 
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writing, to a new image-based consciousness reliant on scientific, calculatory thought. The pho-
tograph owes its existence to such thinking but, true to its status as an image, that is, as a surface 
showing states of things, it acts as a transparent window onto the world. For Flusser this is a key 
moment. It signals a shift from a linear to an image code once again but this ‘new’ imagination is 
different from the one superseded by linear thought. The photograph freezes events into scenes, 
it effects the damming up of history. It signals the end of the dominance of linear, historical 
thinking. The photograph may appear to reflect the world directly. It has an indexical relation to 
the scene it pictures and the light or likeness it captures. But on the contrary, the vector of signi-
fication has reversed. For Ströhl, “photographs are post-historical because they do not find their 
origin in a process of abstraction, but go through a process of concretization.” (Ströhl 2002: xxv)  
The camera is a black box with input and output. Its inner workings remain unknown to its 
user, or indeed, this user may be removed altogether and the camera may automatically produce 
images. The black box is a place where processes occur that are both hidden from view and not 
visible, processes that rely on knowledge encoded as scientific notation. The camera’s ‘program’ 
determines the nature of the images produced and as such, it programs its user. The photogra-
pher unwittingly becomes a function of the camera apparatus which itself is a function of a 
broader apparatus (industrial, economic, or political, for example). Those who program are them-
selves programmed by a meta-program of their apparatus, and so on: “Every program functions 
as a function of a meta-program and the programmers of a program are functionaries of the me-
ta-program.” (Flusser 2000: 29) The camera is an invention, a construct. It is the result of a train 
of thought that is conceptual, linear, and rational. Through this device, we create pictures of the 
world and they act like windows onto the world. But the pictures are a product of the camera; 
they are projected out from the camera onto the world. We begin to think and see in terms of the 
photographs and we perform our functions as operators of this system. For Flusser the im-
portance of making this distinction was that as operators, as a matter of political and social neces-
sity, we should attempt to work against the device: to program it rather than be programmed by 
it; to strive for the improbable as opposed to the probable. 
The technical image—photographic, televisual, digital—replaces a symbolic, magical order 
with a programmed order. It is difficult to decode. An image constructed from scientific texts, its 
apparent transparency obscures the texts embedded within it. The image’s users believe they see 
the world through the technical image rather than the apparatus that enables it. However, such 
images do not make these hermetic texts comprehensible but distort them by translating scien-
tific statements and equations into states of things. By appearing to bring the world transparently 
closer yet paradoxically inserting a new layer of mediation, they change the experience of the 
world for its users. We have stepped still further away from the lebenswelt, the world in which we 
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live, into what Flusser referred to as a new imagination (Flusser 2002a; Flusser 1988; Flusser 
2004).  
But conversely, the world of technical images is as much instigated by us, and by extension 
through these apparatuses, as it is found by us. Worlds are initiated, created and projected rather 
than received and processed. Here the emphasis shifts away from the processing of external visu-
al data, in a more or less automatic (programmed) sense, towards the projection of alternative 
worlds, towards a ‘concretising gesture’. (Flusser 2002a) “The images created by the traditional 
imagination are two-dimensional because they have been abstracted from a four-dimensional life 
world. In comparison, the images of the new imagination are two-dimensional, because they have 
been projected from zero-dimensional calculations”. (Flusser 2002a: 114)  
In the nineteenth century, physical research into electro-magnetism opened up new territo-
ries for communication via the telegraph. Not only a new understanding of space but new possi-
bilities for human relations emerged. (Standage 1998) The development of the digital computer is 
similarly indebted to knowledge of the behaviour of the unseen. But questions surrounding non-
locality, observer relativity and representation that are inherent to modern physics also have a 
broader relevance to modern telematic and electronic societies: shortcuts multiply and physical 
distances seem to shrink still further through ubiquitous computing and communication devices. 
Digital processes universally accelerate the proliferation of images instigated by photography, 
film, and then television, just as these older, analogue media are qualitatively transformed via 
binary encoding. Thus the practice of intersubjective communication is revolutionised and re-
fracted through networks of bits. The swarms of point-like bits that make up the digital domain 
are indescribable but nevertheless calculable. 
To in-form is to materialise. Computer models are an embodiment of this process. They 
concretise. But we remain suspicious of such digital ‘apparitions’ as these are not found in the 
world but created by us.2 Flusser, however, looks to physics as a means to invert the question: it 
is not so much that the artificial, technical forms are more or less real but that the idea of the real 
as a criterion for truth is itself problematic. If the world at the scale of the subatomic particle is 
constituted through relative collections of wave functions in a universal field of matter, the rela-
tive density of these accumulations determines what we experience as real. As the physicist Lev 
Vaidman states, “If a component of the quantum state of the universe, which is a wave function 
in the shape of a man, continues to move (to live?) exactly as a man does, in what sense is it not a 
man? How do I know that I am not this ‘empty’ wave?” (Bruce 2004: 236) 
 
                                                         
2 As Friedrich Kittler puts it, any form of production is contingent upon hardware. “Any transformation of matter 
from entropy to information, from a million sleeping transistors, into differences between electronic potentials nec-
essarily presupposes a material event called reset.” (Kittler 1996: 333) 
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Approximately 26.8% of the universe is presently conceived of as ‘dark matter’, 4.9% baryonic or ordinary matter 
(the things that can be sensed), with 68.3% determined to be ‘dark energy’. Given how extensive the universe is, 
the fact that there is ‘stuff’ existing in the unaccountably vast spaces between stars and galaxies perhaps seems 
inevitable. Does this stuff metaphorically occupy the same space that /cloud/ inhabits? 
 
 
Field, Sea, Sky 
 
It goes without saying that changes in knowledge since linear perspective was developed—or 
rediscovered—centuries ago have been truly seismic. (cf. Edgerton 1975) Perspective is just one 
of the many things that have contributed to the ‘modern world’. Without veering somewhat off 
course it is not feasible to discuss here contemporary understandings of space, matter, energy, or 
time, save to say that the ‘grid’ of perspective could be said to have been absorbed into (the no-
tion of) a connected field of points or nodes. Space does not exist simply as an empty vessel: 
things define the space in which they are situated and space defines those things in turn. They 
cannot be separated. Moreover, if like matter, space itself has a grain—a discrete quantum struc-
ture—the relative distribution or dispersal of particles, the ‘stuff’, that makes up the entirety of 
the physical world / universe occurs within a connected ‘field’. What is referred to as ‘matter’ or 
‘space’ is a relative agglomeration in the density of this field. An entity is constituted from parts 
that connect it with its surroundings; a thing is an amassing or coalescence in the field.  
Flusser’s essay ‘The City as a Wave-Trough in the Image-Flood’ provides a brief reflection on the 
nature of the city seen less as a physical space than as a formation of networks of connections 
between people, and, written before the development of the world wide web, it hints at a world 
to come where humans are immersed in waves of data, awash with images and information. 
(Flusser 2005d) Again using metaphors from the world of physics to express the connections 
between people, Flusser describes gravity wells (climbing out of one gravity well, the Earth’s, one 
falls into the Sun’s or Mars’), nets of space in which matter collects, “the image of the city as a 
field of flections” (Flusser 2005d: 323), and so on. He asserts that through dialogue—through the 
net of relations one has with one’s fellow human beings—an aspect of oneself emerges.  
These aspects Flusser associates with “masks” and the city is a “mask rental shop”, where one 
adopts different selves according to different contexts. The self is less a kernel, an irreducible nub 
(a kernel is also a fundamental part of a computer’s software, one that negotiates between the 
CPU or memory and its applications, for example), than a shell, a net of relations, the threads of 
which are channels through which information flows. “If one holds fast to the image of an inter-
subjective field of relations—we is concrete, I and you are abstractions of this—then the new 
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image of the city gains contours.” (Flusser 2005d: 325) The denser the net, the more concrete are 
the relations between humans: “These dense places develop into wave-troughs in the field that 
we must imagine as oscillating back and forth.” (Flusser 2005d: 325-6) Going on to talk of a 
“Project of Projections”, he muses over the un-geographically locatable nature of the city as, ra-
ther than bricks and mortar, it is more the place “where humans open up to one another” and 
this place can be anywhere. (Flusser 2005d: 327) To draw on the water motif, if the image is thus 
immersed and by extension, necessarily connected to its onlookers but where the distinctions 
between things are blurred, can we see /cloud/ as embodying this uncertainty? 
 
“The real is surrounded by the possible like an island by the ocean. We live on the beaches of the real.” (Flusser 
[2723]: 1) 
 
Thought as expressed via language—that is, language in a broad sense, encompassing text, math-
ematical calculation, coding, and so on—could in one sense be seen as like a net cast out into the 
ocean. The lines of the net correspond to language and the fabric signified by its weave corre-
sponds to the measure we have of the world. Its intersections, its knots or nodes, coincide with 
what is habitually referred to as real or actual. The net is also mutable; its form and extent can 
shift depending on the questions asked. Taking the metaphor a stage further, it may be worth 
taking account of the water, the ocean, in addition to those things that it ‘contains’. The net could 
be redefined in relation to the field in which it is submerged. Rather than being a substance fun-
damentally different to its surroundings, it is seen as being of the same materiality though differ-
entiated in terms of its material density. Rather than a discrete entity within a sea of data, for ex-
ample, perhaps it can be seen as a floating intersection, more or less dispersed within this medi-
um. 
The ineffable—perhaps embodied in the notion of /cloud/—is that which escapes language, that 
which is free to float through the gaps between the net’s nodes or intersections. According to 
Flusser’s thinking, the more tightly woven the net, the closer together those nodes, and the more 
extensive our comprehension of the world. As a result we become more distanced and separated 
from the world. In this sense the ‘world’ we inhabit with this knowledge is constructed though 
language and the limits of language become the limits of this world. Does /cloud/ slip through 
this increasingly fine mesh or is it somehow always within—intrinsic to—the substance of matter, 
filling the field of actuality as a ‘fractal form’? Science tries to capture the world through its de-
scription and yet one of the peculiar observations that modern physics yields is the immensity of 
the (relative) spaces between objects at minuscule scales. 
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A productive incompleteness 
 
The quest for the sublime in the everydayness of things—and the irony of this quest within a 
modern, technological world—is tinged with melancholy perhaps owing to the futility of this 
search or the exponential growth in attempts to record the transience of experience via (social) 
media. Between the fact of the image and the fact itself—the world—exists a space perhaps char-
acterised by loss. Attempts to subjugate the image by text, for example, by locating it within the 
parentheses of metadata will likely be unending. Great strides have been made in image recogni-
tion but the dominance of text over image in terms of the former's ‘search-ability’ perhaps points 
to the practical issues involved, as we inhabit a system that is dominantly constituted through the 
logic embodied by text. But enmeshed as it is in a net of description, the image still resists. Just as 
the cloud in the sky invites one to become lost in speculation, the image can conflate perception 
and reverie.  
 
       
         Tim O’Riley, Speculative Object (#10), 2011 (sign paint, spirit level, length 101 cm) 
 
Given science’s meticulous knowledge about fluid dynamics and the physical makeup and behav-
iour of states of matter, a model of literal cloud can now be computed, embedded in code. In 
terms of an image or model of such phenomena, the cloud becomes absorbed into the system. 
Yet, within this system, is there not a possibility of the disruption or aberration that /cloud/ may 
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still represent? Ideas revolving around chance, doubt, uncertainty, or the unanticipated spring to 
mind; an imagination embedded in a systematic process can potentially insert the unforeseen or 
intractable into the system. It could use the system’s rationality to disrupt itself: to transcend rea-
son by rational means. Prioritising laterality over linearity, the (technical) image can be read in 
multiple ways and directions. If the idea of /cloud/ has traction in the sense described, embed-
ding uncertainty within the system—giving space for action—makes computed forms potentially 
liberating. Moreover, image-making could be seen to offer provisionality as a virtue by its antici-
pation of a person mulling or ruminating over, addressing, seeing the image in multiple ways, or 
‘reading’ it from different directions. One finishes a sentence implied by the image (or for that 
matter, perhaps another sentence entirely, one tangentially prompted by the image). It is neces-
sarily incomplete. The benefits of being in a state of uncertainty and inhabiting doubt—Keats’ 
negative capability—encompass not only the artist but also the viewer. (Keats 2014b: 78–9) This is 
also true of similar dualities such as producer / consumer or writer / reader. And if we agree with 
Marcel Duchamp’s famous assertion that “the spectator makes the picture” (Duchamp 1975: 
105) and thus that these dualities are open to question, the provisionality heralded by /cloud/ 
and by the nature of the (technical) image can problematise, confound, or even offer an antidote 
to the systematising drive in this mediated world.  
 
          
                                      Bisected boat, London, 2016 (photograph | Tim O’Riley) 
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